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RESURRECTING THE INTERNATIONAL
WHALING COMMISSION:
SUGGESTIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE
CONSERVATION EFFORT
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite strong international opposition from non-whaling
nations and conservationist groups, Japanese whaling fleets
set sail in August 2000 to hunt 160 minke along with 50
Bryde's and ten sperm whales' in what the country has deemed
a scientific research expedition.2 Tremendous success of Japa-
nese restaurants specializing in expensive whale-meat cuisine,
however, has created a newly inflamed dispute dominated by
the majority of non-whaling nations, including the United
States and the United Kingdom, who openly oppose Japan's
expanded efforts at what appears to be "commercial" whaling
in contravention of international whaling regulations.' Fifteen
nations engaged in a diplomatic protest in Tokyo on August 21,
2000 to express profound disappointment at Japan's increased
1. There are seventy-six species of whales, dolphins and porpoises that
belong to the order Cetacea. Whales are generally divided into two catego-
ries: (1) the Odontoceti, the toothed whales; and (2) the Mysticeti, also known
as Baleen whales, so named for a filter like structure hanging from their
upper jaws. See International Whaling Commission, Great Whales, at
http'//www.iwcoffice.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2002). Minke whales, the
smallest of the Baleen whales, range up to thirty-three feet. Id. Bryde's
whales can yield as much meat in the Japanese market as five minke whales
and adult sperm whales, the largest of the toothed whales, can reach lengths
of sixty feet and weigh up to forty-five tons. Id. See also Suvendrini Kaku-
chi, Blowing Their Top: Greens React Angrily as Japan Ups the Ante in the
Whale Hunt Row, ASiA WEEK, Oct. 13, 2000, available at
http'/www.asiaweek.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2002). This is the first time
Japan has included sperm whales and Bryde's whales in its research program
since 1971 and 1979, respectively. Both species are protected under the U.S.
Marine Mammal Protection Act, and sperm whales are listed as endangered
under the Endangered Species Act. See Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1421 (2000); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
2. Calvin Sims, Japan, Feasting on Whale, Sniffs at 'Culinary Imperial-
ists'of U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 2000, at Al.
3. Id.
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whaling activities and to urge the country to halt lethal re-
search whaling.4 This group included representatives of The
Netherlands, Ireland, New Zealand, Austria, Brazil, the U.K.,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Monaco, Sweden,
Switzerland and the U.S.
5
Currently, Japan is the most vocal proponent in favor of
commercial whaling and the world's single largest consumer of
whale meat.' Conservationist groups and anti-whaling nations
are convinced that Japanese research whaling is a thinly dis-
guised covert operation intended to boost supplies of whale
meat in a marketplace where it fetches more than ten times
the price of pork or beef.7 Japanese officials, however, continu-
ally deny these allegations and argue that the scientific re-
search is necessary to determine the effect these whales have
on the Japanese fishing industry.' Nevertheless, these argu-
ments have failed to convince the international community
that Japan's efforts are legitimate.
For centuries, whales provided valuable natural resources in
the form of food and fuel to the world's population, and the
whaling industry contributed substantially to the economic
wealth of countries such as Norway, England, The Nether-
lands, the U.S., Japan and Russia.9 By the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, scientific evidence revealed that the historic overexploita-
tion of whale stocks had rendered a number of species severely
endangered and still others commercially extinct. The Interna-
tional Convention for the Regulation of Whaling ("ICRW" or
4. Fifteen Nations Ask Japan to Stop Research Whaling, CNN.coM (Aug.
21, 2000), at http://www.cnn.com2000/NATURE/08/21japan.whaling.reut
(last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
5. Id.
6. Judith Berger-Eforo, Note, Sanctuary for the Whales: Will This be the
Demise of the International Whaling Commission or a Viable Strategy for the
Twenty-First Century?, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. 439, 450 (1996).
7. Japan, Three Other Nations to Set-Up Whale Committee, MARINE
MAMMAL NEWS (on file with author).
8. Eric Talmadge, No Apologies: Japan Says Killing of Whales is for
Research Purposes, ABC NEws.coM (Sept. 5, 2000), at http'//abcnews.go.com/
sectionlscience/DailyNews/whalemeat 000905.html.
9. Berger-Eforo, supra note 6, at 443. Today, the pro-whaling nations
still consider whales a viable resource for food, oil, leather and medicine. Id.
at 441.
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"Convention")" was initially created as a whaling cartel in re-
sponse to these devastating statistics to ensure the sustainable
development of whale stocks throughout the world. As public
opinion shifted in the 1970's, several states joined the Conven-
tion to influence its policies in favor of whale preservation. The
dichotomy between the few states who still hunt whales and
those opposed to whaling has created intense conflict within
the Convention.
Since 1946, the ICRW has been the only multilateral inter-
national agreement focused solely on the regulation of whale
stocks. As one of the earliest treaties designed to address the
management of a specific natural resource shared across state
borders, the ICRW, along with several others like it," signified
the start of an era in which states would become cognizant of
the existence of environmental commitments beyond their own
territories. Specifically, the ICRW has served as an important
instrument calling the world's attention to the historic overex-
ploitation of whales. Yet, its credibility has been marred by a
series of failures in protecting the animals from further exploi-
tation. As a result of these widely publicized failures, the Con-
vention has garnered unfavorable reviews by world observers
and may itself be in danger of extinction. 2
The International Whaling Commission ("IWC" or "Commis-
sion") was created pursuant to the ICRW to implement the
Convention's objectives."3 Thus far, the IWC has been the "sole
international body with the authority to regulate commercial
whaling operations around the world."'4 Unfortunately, this
role can only be described as symbolic, given the apparent in-
ability of the IWC independently to enforce its regulations or to
10. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946,
62 Stat. 1716, T.IA.S. No. 1849 [hereinafter ICRWI.
11. These include, for example, the 1933 London Convention on Preserva-
tion of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, Nov. 8, 1933, 172 L.N.T.S.
241, and the 1940 Washington Convention on Nature Protection and Wild
Life Preservation, Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354, 161 U.N.T.S. 193. See also
Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues
and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEo. L.J. 675, 676 (1993).
12. See Berger-Eforo, supra note 6, at 440.
13. ICRW, supra note 10, art. III.
14. Kieran Mulvaney, The International Whaling Commission and the
Role of Non-Governmental Organizations, 9 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 347,
347 (1997).
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sanction member nations engaging in activities that undermine
the Commission's goals. The IWC's structural design appears
to build on the traditional horizontal theory of international
law. This theory suggests that states will, in their own self-
interest, recognize the importance of complying with IWC regu-
lations and act accordingly. However, as the focus of the
Commission's agenda shifted from sustainable development of
the natural resource represented by whales to complete conser-
vation of dwindling whale stocks in the late 1970's, pro-whaling
nations began to explore ways to subvert compliance with IWC
regulations and capitalize on the profitability of whale meat
and byproducts in their own markets."
Several provisions of the Convention effectively dilute the
IWC's authority and facilitate the ability of pro-whaling na-
tions to subvert compliance with IWC regulations. First, an
"opt out" provision in the treaty makes it virtually impossible
for the Commission to curtail the actions of member nations
who oppose a specific regulation." Essentially, this clause pro-
vides that a member nation in opposition to any amendment
instituted by the IWC need only file a timely objection to be
considered exempt from that regulation. 7 Second, the ICRWs
only enforcement mechanism for addressing violations of IWC
regulations is squarely based on the concept of self-policing.
Specifically, Article IX of the Convention stipulates that each
member nation shall punish violations of any regulation car-
ried out by persons under their jurisdiction." Further, to com-
plicate matters, the IWC has no ability to monitor whaling ac-
tivities in waters under its auspices. Fishing and whaling
fleets, such as those sent out by Japan in August 2000, often
operate unnoticed and unobserved in international waters. 9
This Note will the explore the current crisis facing the IWC
in light of Japan's increased efforts to profit from the exploita-
tion of whale stocks in contravention of the ICRW. Part II will
briefly outline the general history of the commercial whaling
15. Berger-Eforo, supra note 6, at 449-450.
16. ICRW, supra note 10, art. V(3).
17. Id.
18. Id. art. IX(1).
19. See David S. Ardia, Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement
of International Law Protecting the Marine Environment, 19 MICH. INT'L L.
497, 498 (1998).
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industry and the effects the industry has had on international
whale stocks. Part III will present an overview of the Conven-
tion and examine the changing role of the IWC throughout the
whaling controversy. It will include an analysis of the recent
transition in IWC policy from a position of sustained develop-
ment for future harvest to one of protection and conservation.
Part IV will discuss the existing framework for enforcement
under the ICRW and the difficulties that framework has cre-
ated in the international arena. Part V will examine the at-
tempts by the U.S. to enter the whaling controversy by utiliz-
ing domestic policy to enforce IWC regulations against member
nations. This section will also explore the failure of unilateral
action as an effective remedy to the problems inherent in the
Convention. Finally, Part VI will suggest possible solutions to
the controversy in light of current developments in interna-
tional environmental law. Approximately 900 international
legal instruments exist that have at least one provision regard-
ing the environment.20  Since the ICRW entered into force in
1949, the scope of similar agreements has increased and the
duties of the parties to these agreements have become more
comprehensive.2' Subsequently, countries have learned a great
deal about the process of negotiating these types of agreements
and their substantive content.22 The IWC may benefit from
these agreements by incorporating modern policies into its ex-
isting framework to provide a more comprehensive enforcement
mechanism based largely on international cooperation in moni-
toring whaling efforts throughout the world's oceans.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF WHALING: THE DEMISE OF LEVIATHAN
"The history of human interaction with whales has been
marked by a seemingly irreconcilable tension between adula-
tion of, and even awe for, the 'monarchs of the deep' and the
counterpoised desire to commercially exploit cetacean species
for economic gain."2 Unfortunately, this desire for economic
20. See Brown Weiss, supra note 11, at 678.
21. Id. at 679.
22. Id. at 684.
23. William C. Burns, The International Whaling Commission and the
Future of Cetaceans: Problems and Prospects, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POLY 31, 31 (1997).
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gain has resulted in the devastation of numerous species of
whales throughout the past centuries.24 As a result, the his-
toric overexploitation of whales has been described as "the most
infamous example of human mismanagement of the earth's
natural resources. 25
Whales have inhabited the Earth for over seventy million
years.26 Prior to the development of the commercial whaling
industry in the thirteenth century, approximately four million
whales populated the world's oceans.27 In 1975, that figure was
only slightly larger than two million, of which about 1.2 million
were sufficiently mature for capture.28 More importantly, how-
ever, some research indicates that these statistics severely un-
derestimate the effect that commercial whaling has had on
several of the largest whale species. Before the advent of the
commercial whaling industry, for example, an estimated
210,000 blue whales, the largest of the whale species, roamed
the oceans. 29 At present, scientific evidence indicates that the
population of blue whales may have decreased to approxi-
mately 450 animals." Additionally, humpback whale stocks
are now estimated at only 1% of their pre-whaling levels.31
Some researchers believe that four of the nine species of great
24. Id. at 31. There is evidence that whaling dates back as early as the
year 1500 B.C.; however, many scholars identify the Basques of Biscay as the
first civilization to transform whaling into an organized industry in the thir-
teenth century. See Patricia Birnie, International Legal Issues in the Man-
agement and Protection of the Whale: A Review of Four Decades of Experience
29 NAT. RES. J. 903, 904 (1989). By the sixteenth century, the Basques' whal-
ing techniques had spread across the Atlantic. Id. Americans began whaling
in the eighteenth century and by the nineteenth century had developed "one
of the world's leading whaling fleets," which in turn depleted whale stocks on
both coasts of the United States. Id. The American whaling operations be-
gan to decline in the mid-nineteenth century with the development of the
petroleum industry. Id. Soon thereafter, Norway assumed dominance of the
whaling industry with the aid of technological advancements such as the
exploding harpoon gun. Id.
25. SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 17 (1985).
26. Burns, supra note 23, at 32.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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whales are "severely endangered" and that two of these species
have been rendered commercially extinct.
32
The early twentieth century witnessed the development of
the modern whaling industry and the subsequent devastation
of whale stocks throughout the world. During this period, sci-
entific and technological advancements such as steam engines
and exploding harpoon guns led to more efficient kills over a
larger geographic area33 and damaged whale populations al-
most to the brink of extinction.34 One of the more significant
developments in the industry at this time was the use of the
factory ship as the primary method of whale harvest.35 Essen-
tially, this form of whaling provided for a processing plant at
sea - an entire whale could be hunted, captured and processed
even before the ship entered port. Specifically, whalers on in-
dividual ships could harvest the economically viable parts of
the captured whale and discard the rest at sea, thus increasing
the amount of whale meat and other byproducts that could be
stored in the ship's hold while still at sea.36 This proved eco-
nomically disastrous for the hunting and fishing industries in
many countries that soon recognized that the economic success
of their whaling efforts depended largely on worldwide avail-
ability of whale stocks.7
Limited attempts to regulate whaling were instituted as
early as 1918.38 These attempts continued throughout the
1930's, but were wholly unsuccessful. 9 Finally, in 1946, ac-
knowledging that the viability of commercial whaling could
only be ensured by international cooperation, fifteen nations0
gathered in Washington D.C. to draft the ICRW.
32. Burns, supra note 23, at 32-33.
33. Howard Scott Schiffian, The Protection of Whales in International
Law: A Perspective for the Next Century, 22 BROOK. J. INTL L. 303, 308
(1996).
34. Berger-Eforo, supra note 6, at 444.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right
to Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 29 (1991).
39. Id.
40. They were: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark,
France, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, The Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
2002] 645
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE REGULATION
OF WHALING
The ICRW begins with a Preamble that announces in general
terms the objects and purposes of the Convention. It recog-
nizes the interest of the nations "in safeguarding for future
generations the great natural resources represented by the
whale stocks," and acknowledges historic over-fishing of whales
and the subsequent need for regulation "without causing wide-
spread economic and nutritional distress."' Finally, the Pre-
amble states the main objective of the ICRW as "proper and
effective conservation and development of whale stocks" ena-
bling the "orderly development of the whaling industry."' To
effectuate these policies, the ICRW established the IWC,43 in-
tended to "provide for the conservation, development, and op-
timum utilization of the whale resources."'
A. The International Whaling Commission
The IWC was created by voluntary agreement among the
member nations to function as the sole governing body with
authority to act under the ICRW and to implement its eco-
nomic and environmental goals. To that end, the IWC was em-
powered to amend the Convention's Schedule of Regulations,
("Schedule")" by designating protected species, open and closed
whaling seasons and waters for whaling, determine size limits,
methods and intensity of whaling, types of gear to be used,
methods of measurement and maximum catch returns." In an
land, the United States of America, and the Union of South Africa. ICRW,
supra note 10, art. XI.
41. Id. pmbl.
42. Id.
43. Id. art. III.
44. See id. art. V(2).
45. Article I(1) of the ICRW incorporates the Schedule (as amended) into
the Convention as an integral part thereof. ICRW, supra note 10, art. I(1).
The schedule has been described as a flexible instrument of regulation that is
easily adaptable to changing policies. PATRICIA BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION OF WHALING TO CONSERVATION
OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF WHALE-WATCHING 196 (1985).
46. ICRW, supra note 10, art. V(1). The Schedule contains detailed regu-
lations governing the protection and exploitation of whales.
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effort to reinforce its dedication to the sustainable development
of whale stocks for future harvest, the Convention requires
that any amendments to the Schedule be "based on scientific
findings," taking into consideration the "interests of consumers
of whale products and the whaling industry."4 7 Two things de-
serve special note: (1) participation in the IWC is not limited
only to states involved in commercial whaling; and (2) the
whaling controversy is a direct consequence of the influx into
the IWC of conservation-minded nations during the 1970's.48
As one observer noted:
Most of the current issues... derive from the ambiguous phi-
losophies on which the ICRW was based, set out in its pream-
ble - the conflict between conservation of whales purely for
purposes of industrial sustenance and conservation of whales
for their own sake as uniquely huge marine mammals with
valuable and attractive characteristics about which and from
which man has still much to learn to his own benefit.49
Traditionally, the IWC meets annually and is composed of
one voting representative from each party who may be accom-
panied by experts and advisors." The IWC's Rules of Proce-
dure allow non-parties and intergovernmental organizations to
attend the meetings and to be represented by observers if they
have submitted a written request to the Secretary thirty days
before the meeting or if they have attended previous meet-
ings.51  Non-governmental international organizations that
maintain offices in more than three countries may attend the
annual meetings of the IWC."2
1. The Evolution of the International Whaling Commission
The history of the IWC's regime has been marked by two dis-
tinct periods of differing ideologies. The first significant period
in the history of the IWC begins with its creation in 1946 and
extends until the 1981 decision to enact a moratorium on all
47. Id. art. V(2).
48. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 38, at 39.
49. Birnie, supra note 24, at 914.
50. ICRW, supra note 10, art. III(1).
51. Rules of Procedure of the International Whaling Commission, IWC,
B(2)(a)-(b) (2000).
52. Id.
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commercial whaling. Throughout this period, the IWC's ad-
ministration was marked by a series of failed attempts to regu-
late the commercial whaling industry through a quota-based
system. 3 The second period, from the 1981 moratorium until
the present, represents the transformation of the 1WC from an
agency solely concerned with the regulation of whale stocks for
sustained development and future harvest to an agency with
an environmental conscience.
From its inception until the late 1960's, the IWC attempted
to maintain world commercial whaling through a system of
quotas in an effort to allow individual whale stocks to replenish
in number. 4 The IWC, dominated by pro-whaling nations,
rarely took the recommendations of its Scientific Committee
seriously when developing these quotas, despite increasing evi-
dence that certain whale species were being depleted to dan-
gerously low levels." As a result, "[wihale stocks were regu-
larly over-exploited, and scientific advice concerning sustaining
catch limits was frequently ignored. When populations were
finally protected from further hunting, it was usually after they
had already collapsed."56 Failure of the IWC to effectively regu-
late whale stocks throughout this period prompted several au-
thorities to conclude that "all large whales could be driven to
the point of extinction in a few years if stringent conservation
measures were not immediately adopted. 57
The 1970's witnessed a number of encouraging developments
as the decade marked the beginning of the global anti-whaling
movement. As the international movement in opposition to the
slaughter of marine mammals gained momentum during this
decade, a number of non-whaling and anti-whaling states
joined the Convention and eventually gained a majority over a
dwindling number of pro-whaling nations. 8 More crucially,
nations like the United States, which were previously consid-
ered major whaling forces, became strong anti-whaling compo-
53. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 38, at 22.
54. Id. at 34-35.
55. See Burns, supra note 23, at 35 (providing a detailed account of the
IWC's quota system throughout this period).
56. Alexander Gillespie, The Ethical Question in the Whaling Debate, 9
GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 355, 355 (1997).
57. Burns, supra note 23, at 41.
58. Gillespie, supra note 56, at 356.
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nents of the Commission. The new conservation-minded states
began to advocate greater restrictions on whaling, citing new
scientific studies demonstrating the advanced intellectual ca-
pacity of whales. These nations, along with the global commu-
nity, called for the IWC to reform its policies and to incorporate
newly discovered scientific data regarding whales in its pro-
posed regulations. 9 Still, the Commission was reluctant to
abandon its traditional methods of regulation.
Starting in the early, 1970's, the Commission was bombarded
with startling declarations made by other international con-
ventions recognizing the dire plight of whales and, in effect,
highlighting the Commission's repeated failures.60 In 1972, the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at
Stockholm ("Stockholm Conference")61 adopted a proposal that
recommended a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling to
allow whale stocks to recover. 2 Immediately, Japan opposed
the recommendation and labeled the resolution dramatic and
emotional.' The IWC argued that a "blanket moratorium"
could not be scientifically justified." Nonetheless, the protec-
tionist sentiment embodied in the Stockholm Conference in-
creased pressure on the IWC to change its policies and pro-
voked the growing internal conflict between anti-whaling and
pro-whaling states within the Commission.65 In 1977, the first
report of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species ("CITES")6 was released. The report characterized cer-
tain whales already protected by the IWC as "endangered spe-
59. Berger-Eforo, supra note 6, at 442. According to the author, interna-
tional public support for the anti-whaling movement coincided with scientific
discoveries regarding the intellectual capacity of whales. Id.
60. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 38, at 38.
61. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
AIConf.49/14fRev.1, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). See also D'Amato & Chopra, su-
pra note 38, at 36.
62. Stockholm Action Plan, Recommendation 33, UN Doc.
A/CONF.49/l4/Rev.1, 11 I.L.M. 1421 (1972).
63. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 38, at 38.
64. Id. at 39.
65. Id.
66. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 6, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter
CITES].
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cies."" By 1981, CITES had identified more species of whales
as being in danger of extinction than the IWC had even recog-
nized as a "protected species., 68 "Outflanked on its left by
CITES, the IWC reacted by moving ever closer to the CITES
position." 9 Finally, the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea ("UNCLOS"), completed in 1982, provided inter alia
that "[s]tates shall cooperate with a view to the conservation of
marine mammals and in the case of [whales] shall in particular
work through the appropriate international organizations for
the conservation, management and study."
70
Faced with rapidly declining whale stocks and under pres-
sure from the international community to increase protection of
whales, the IWC started to move away from a position of man-
agement to one of conservation and, finally, preservation.71  By
1981, it became clear that the protectionist sentiment articu-
lated in the Stockholm Conference, the CITES regulations and
UNCLOS had gained dominance within the IWC.
The clash between the pro-whaling and the anti-whaling
states culminated in the establishment of a moratorium on all
commercial whaling at the thirty-fourth annual meeting of the
IWC.72 The moratorium was adopted by a vote of twenty-five to
seven with five abstentions and mandated that commercial
whaling quotas be set at zero starting in the 1985-whaling sea-
son.73 The amendment stated that the effects of the morato-
rium on whale stocks would be examined five years later to
ascertain the effectiveness of the moratorium and determine
whether a return to higher quotas was feasible. 74 The whaling
nations were granted a three year phase-out period to gradu-
67. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 38, at 43.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3.
71. See Sarah Suhre, Note, Misguided Morality: The Repercussions of the
International Whaling Commission's Shift from a Policy of Regulation to One
of Preservation, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 305, 310 (1999).
72. Chairman's Report of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting of the International
Commission on Whaling, at 17-42, IWC Doc. No. 21 (1982).
73. Thirty-Fourth Meeting, IWC (1982).
74. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 38, at 48.
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ally bring their practices to an end and manage impending
economic ramifications of the moratorium.75
In efforts to appease the traditional whaling nations, the
moratorium went into effect with two compromise clauses -
aboriginal subsistence whaling76 and scientific whaling. De-
spite these clauses, Japan immediately lodged a timely objec-
tion to the moratorium and continued to engage in the practice
of commercial whaling.77 Japan's objection effectively rendered
the IWC powerless to enforce the moratorium against the coun-
try pursuant to the opt-out provision of the ICRW.78 Soon after
the moratorium entered into force, Japan began a systematic
program of scientific research concerning the marine mammals
under the auspices of the government-linked Institute for Ceta-
cean Research ("Institute").79 Investigators from the Institute,
which analyzes data from the hunts, captain all Japanese
whaling vessels. The Institute is "expected to function as a
center of research efforts made by independent researchers,"8'
such as national laboratories, universities, voluntary research
75. Suhre, supra note 71, at 310.
76. The aboriginal subsistence whaling exception has not created the con-
troversy implicated by the scientific research exception. Individuals who
claim this exception are allowed to hunt whales subject to certain IWC im-
posed quotas and must meet the following requirements: (1) whaling for
purposes of local aboriginal, indigenous or native people who share strong,
community, family, social and cultural ties related to a continuing traditional
dependence on whaling and on the use of whales; (2) traditional uses of whale
product by local aboriginal, indigenous or native communities to meet their
nutritional, subsistence and cultural requirements; and (3) subsistence
catches of whales made by aboriginal subsistence whaling operations. The
International Whaling Commission, Aboriginal-Subsistence Whaling, at
http'//www.iwcoffice.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2002). It should be emphasized
that meeting these requirements is quite difficult. Therefore, it is extremely
unlikely that a country wishing to subvert the goals of the IWC in favor of
commercial whaling will invoke the aboriginal subsistence whaling exemp-
tion.
77. Berger-Eforo, supra note 6, at 456.
78. See discussion, infra Part IV.A.
79. Institute for Cetacean Research, About ICRW, at
http://www.whalesci.org.abouticr.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinaf-
ter Institute for Cetacean Research]. The Institute for Cetacean Research is
a nonprofit organization under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries, Government of Japan. Id.
80. See Talmadge, supra note 8.
81. Institute for Cetacean Research, supra note 79.
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institutions and individual researchers. In addition to coordi-
nating research efforts, the Institute is in charge of marketing
the whale meat and other byproducts once the whales are proc-
essed and data is collected to national suppliers.82 Sales aver-
age between $27 and $36 million per year, and the proceeds are
used to fund additional research. 3
Despite allegations that the research programs are "bogus,"
Japanese officials argue that the research is necessary to de-
termine the impact of whales on fish populations in Japanese
waters"4 and that it will reveal valuable information concerning
the viability of world food supplies.85 Conservationists concede
that Japan's scientific whaling expeditions can be justified un-
der IWC rules; however, they maintain that Japan is using re-
search whaling to satisfy the demand for whale meat in the
marketplace.86
IV. THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK FOR ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE
ICRW
In spite of its expansive goals and theoretically sound
framework, the IWC has repeatedly failed to create a success-
ful protocol for the regulation of commercial whaling. While
the Commission has played a significant role in bringing the
world's attention to the plight of the whale, many provisions
have left it unable to enforce its own regulations. First, any
country that disagrees with a particular IWC regulation may,
by filing an objection, delay its implementation and exempt
itself from the regulation pursuant to the opt-out clause of the
ICRW.87 Second, IWC rules, including the moratorium, only
preclude the harvest of whales for commercial, not scientific,
purposes.88 The exception allows lethal research to be per-
formed on whales and provides that the whale meat may be
utilized in any manner so long as it is not exported outside of
the researching country.89 The so-called scientific whaling ac-
82. See Talmadge, supra note 8.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Kakuchi, supra note 1.
86. See discussion infra, Part IV.B.
87. ICRW, supra note 10, art. V(3).
88. Id. art. VIII.
89. Id.
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tivities of Japan have proved that this loophole renders the
moratorium ineffective. Third, all authority to punish infrac-
tions is vested within the country having jurisdiction over the
violations." No procedure exists by which the IWC can itself
enforce its regulations at an international level. Finally, the
IWC is afforded no mechanism for monitoring the activities of
whaling ships in the waters under its auspices. As a result,
illegal whaling operations and inaccurate reporting occur with-
out the knowledge of the Commission.
A. The Opt Out Provision: Taking the "Teeth" Out of the Com-
mission
The ICRW provides for a prolonged objection procedure that
has often been criticized for "taking the teeth" 9' out of the
Commission. The procedure allows one state to delay imple-
mentation of a regulation in all member states for three
months. In addition, by simply lodging a timely objection, the
state itself is completely exempted from the regulation. 2 Spe-
cifically, Article V(3) states:
Each of such amendments shall become effective with respect
to the Contracting Governments ninety days following notifi-
cation of the amendment by the Commission... except that if
any Government presents to the Commission objection to any
amendment prior to the expiration of this ninety-day period
the amendment shall not become effective with respect to any
of the Governments for an additional ninety days... thereaf-
ter, the amendment shall become effective with respect to all
Contracting Governments which have not presented objection
but shall not become effective with respect to any Govern-
90. Id. art. IX(l).
91. The IWC recognizes that the provision has been criticized for render-
ing the Commission "toothless," but argues that the Convention would never
have been signed without it. See The International Whaling Commission,
The Objection Procedure, at http'//www.iwcoffice.org (last visited Mar. 21,
2002). Further, the IWC contends that even without the right, a government
would just as likely withdraw from the Convention to avoid being bound by a
disagreeable regulation. Id.
92. ICRW, supra note 10, art. V(3).
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ment which has so objected until such date as the objection is
withdrawn.9 3
Clearly, this provision reflects the traditional international
legal theory that a sovereign state is only bound to that which
it has explicitly agreed. However, the provision has left the
IWC with little authority to impose regulations on countries
like Japan who demonstrate an intent to return to commercial
whaling despite international opinion. The provision has essen-
tially given whaling countries carte blanche authority to ignore
regulations imposed by the IWC rather than face potentially
unpleasant ramifications. Historically, members have used the
objection procedure to avoid otherwise applicable quotas, to
reject the classification of stocks where it would reduce whaling
activities and to ignore IWC imposed standards on humane
killing.94 For example, one of the Commission's first conserva-
tionist measures was defeated in 1954 when Canada, Japan,
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. lodged formal objections to the prohi-
bition on the taking of blue whales in the North Pacific.9 5 The
bloc was comprised of the only four countries engaged in hunt-
ing blue whales in the North Pacific.96 Thus, the IWC action
never entered into force. Similar objections have been lodged
at each IWC meeting during its forty-year history rendering
most of the regulations highly ineffective.97
Arguably, the opt out clause was included in the treaty to en-
sure the national sovereignty of member governments. This
compromise, common to many international agreements, has
left the IWC powerless to address the concerns of the majority
of nations committed to the conservation of whales beyond
their territorial borders. The Commission's lack of authority is
especially significant given Japan's exceptionally poor interna-
tional environmental record.98 Japan has often adopted an ex-
93. Id.
94. Dean M. Wilkinson, The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce Interna-
tional Whaling Agreements: A Critical Perspective, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'y 271, 276 (1989).
95. Sixth Report, at 5, IWC (1955).
96. LYSTER, supra note 25, at 27.
97. Id.
98. See Berger-Eforo, supra note 6, at 456. For example, Japan has been
criticized for not using "dolphin safe" netting in its tuna fishing operations
and for continuing to import ivory over international objection. Id.
654 [Vol. XXVII:2
WHALE CONSERVATION
pansive foreign policy to obtain much-needed natural resources
in spite of international efforts to protect these limited re-
sources.99 The right to extract natural resources from the
global commons is critical to Japan's survival as a nation. As a
regult, Japan refuses to concede on the whaling issue for fear it
might adversely affect the country's tradition of exploration
and exploitation of the seas. 00
B. The Scientific Exception: A Loophole in the Convention
It has been argued that almost every phrase of the ICRW has
been at issue during the forty years that have passed since the
Convention entered into force.' At present, perhaps the most
controversial of the ICRW provisions is the scientific research
exception. Pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the Con-
vention, any country that wishes to conduct scientific research
on whales may invoke the scientific research provision as an
exception to an IWC regulation.0 2 This provision provides:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention, any
Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a
special permit authorizing that nation to kill, take, and treat
whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such re-
strictions as to number and subject to such other conditions
as the Contracting Government thinks fit and the kill, taking,
and treating of whales in accordance Writh the provisions of
this Article shall be exempt from the operation of the Conven-
tion. 103
Prior to 1986, countries wishing to subvert IWC quotas on
specific whale stocks modestly utilized the procedures deline-
ated in Article VIII.O4 With the imposition of the moratorium
on commercial whaling, however, countries like Japan have
systematically invoked the exception to effectively continue the
practice of commercial whaling. The exception has become a
major loophole utilized to undermine IWC regulations and con-
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Birnie, supra note 24, at 913.
102. ICRW, supra note 10, art. VII.
103. Id.
104. LYSTER, supra note 25, at 27.
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servation decisions during the moratorium since "researching"
countries are permitted to use the whale meat collected after
experimentation in any manner they deem acceptable as long
as the meat is not exported outside of the country.' Since the
moratorium entered into force in 1986, Japan, Norway and Ice-
land"°' have issued scientific permits to their nationals." ' For
the last five years, only Japan has issued permits.'08 All per-
mits must be submitted to the IWC's Scientific Committee for
review to determine whether the study is methodologically
sound, but the country retains the ultimate responsibility for
issuance."9
Recent activities conducted and endorsed by the Japanese
government under the country's scientific research program
have enraged the international community and conservationist
groups who argue that the research is only a thinly-veiled at-
tempt to maintain the profitability of the commercial whaling
industry.'10 As early as 1987, Japan announced that it would
take large male sperm whales from the Atlantic under the sci-
entific research exception in order to determine the whales'
primary prey."' The activity generated a great deal of contro-
versy since the scientific community had known for over a cen-
tury that the primary prey of the sperm whale is the squid.
12
105. Berger-Eforo, supra note 6, at 449-50.
106. Iceland withdrew from the Convention with effect on June 30, 1992.
Id.
107. The International Whaling Commission, The IWC, Scientific Permits
and Japan, at http://www.iwcoffice.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinaf-
ter Scientific Permits].
108. Id.
109. Id. The Scientific Committee's review is concentrated on the following
areas: (1) whether the permit adequately specifies its aims, methodology and
the samples to be taken; (2) whether the research is essential for rational
management, the work of the Scientific Committee or other critically impor-
tant research needs; (3) whether the methodology and sample size are likely
to provide reliable answers to the questions being asked; (4) whether the
questions can be answered using non-lethal research methods; (5) whether
the catches will have an adverse effect on the stock; and (6) whether there is
the potential for scientists from other nations to join the research program.
Id.
110. See Burns, supra note 23, at 46.
111. Wilkinson, supra note 94, at 278.
112. Id.
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Moreover, an expansive amount of data already existed in both
Japan and the Soviet Union to support the assertion. 3
More recently, Japan has argued that scientific research is
justified to determine accurate population levels of certain
whale stocks, which it believes to be at harvestable levels.""
These "feasibility studies" are conducted by taking large num-
bers of lethal samples from endangered whales in order to gain
a more complete understanding of sustainable catch limits.
15
At the 2000 annual meeting, Japan submitted an extensive
proposal whereby 100 minke whales, 50 Bryde's whales and ten
sperm whales would be sampled each year."6 The stated objec-
tive of this proposal, known as "JARPN II," is to obtain infor-
mation to contribute to conservation and sustainable use of
marine living resources (including whales) in the western
North Pacific."7 JARPN II raised a considerable deal of dis-
agreement within the Committee that culminated in a majority
adoption of a resolution strongly urging Japan to reconsider
issuing the permit."' The resolution notes that according to
the Scientific Committee, JARPN II "did not address questions
of high priority relevant to management, did not make full use
of existing data, and revealed many methodological problems,"
and it proposes that the information on stock structure, which
might be relevant, could be achieved using non-lethal means."
Nevertheless, in October 2000, five Japanese whaling ships
returned to port amid great celebration with forty-three
Bryde's whales five sperm whales and forty minke whales in
their holds.
20
113. Id.
114. See Sims, supra note 2.
115. Id.
116. Scieitific Permits, supra note 107.
117. Id.
118. International Whaling Commission, IWC Resolution 2000-5: Resolu-
tion on Whaling Under Special Permit in the North Pacific Ocean, at
http'/www.iwcoffice.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
119. Id.
120. Kakuchi, supra note 1.
2002] 657
BROOK. J. INTL L.
C. Discovering and Punishing Infractions: The Problems with
National Monitoring and Self-Policing
Oceans cover an extraordinarily vast portion of the Earth's
surface.12' Even so, in a seemingly impossible task, the IWC
was given authority over all waters in which whaling is carried
on by factory ships, land stations or whale catchers.12   This
authority extends inside states' 200-mile exclusive economic
zone ("EEZ") and even into territorial seas and inland water-
ways."' As a consequence, monitoring the activities of whaling
boats in these waters has proven difficult, if not impossible. In
addition, the power to address infractions (if discovered) is
placed directly in the hands of the state of jurisdiction.'24 No
mechanism exists by which the IWC can directly issue sanc-
tions against countries in violation of the Convention. As a
result, many violations are unnoticed or under-reported and
essentially unpunished on an international level.
Because the IWC lacks the resources to monitor such a large
geographical expanse, it requires that each member country
report the number of whales of each species captured, the
number thereof lost at sea, each whale's sex and length and
whether any females contained a fetus.'25 Since the IWC lacks
any authority to punish pro-whaling nations for violating the
reporting regulations, these nations, acting in their own inter-
ests, are prone to under-report these statistics to the Commis-
sion. These instances of under-reporting have had dire effects
for all nations since the reported statistics are incorporated
into the Schedule and used to calculate global whale popula-
tions.
Perhaps the most stunning example of under-reporting by a
country came when a former scientist in the Soviet Fisheries
Ministry uncovered the existence of secret documents indicat-
121. Oceans cover approximately 71% or 360 million square kilometers of
the Earth's surface. The average depth of the world's oceans is about 3,730
meters (12,230 ft.) and maximum depths can exceed eleven kilometers. See
THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2000), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/65/oc/ocean/html (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
122. ICRW, supra note 10, art. 1(2).
123. LYSTER, supra note 25, at 21.
124. ICRW, supra note 10, art. 1(2).
125. Id. at Schedule as amended at the 51st Annual Meeting in 1999, art.
VI, 91 27 [hereinafter Schedule].
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ing that the U.S.S.R. had ordered the systematic slaughter of
humpback whales over a twenty year period.126 The documents
proved that the Soviet Union killed 48,477 humpback whales
from 1948 until 1973.127 The country officially reported to the
IWC that only 2,710 humpbacks had been killed during that
period. Data collected by the IWC alerted their suspicion
that the Soviet Union was engaged in this deceptive practice
over the years. Still, devoid of an effective enforcement
mechanism, the Commission was forced to incorporate the
country's reported statistics into their own figures, thus de-
stroying the reliability of their calculations. 29
Absence of an international body empowered to address in-
fractions of the ICRW aggravates monitoring deficiencies.
Since pro-whaling states are fully aware that the Commission
cannot compel them to perform their treaty obligations, they
are quick to violate regulations. The Convention leaves en-
forcement entirely in the hands of member states. Accordingly,
each state is required to take "appropriate measures" to ensure
the application of the provisions of the Convention- and to pun-
ish infractions that occur in the course of operations carried out
by persons or vessels under its jurisdiction.30 However, the
ICRW never specifies the types of measures that might be
deemed appropriate. The only leverage the Commission re-
tains is the power to "make recommendations to any or all con-
tracting Governments on any matter that relates to whales or
whaling and to the objectives and purposes of this Conven-
tion."13' The IWC has utilized this illusory authority through-
out the years, but its concerns have frequently been overlooked.
126. David D. Caron, Current Development: The International Whaling
Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Insti-
tutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154,
171 (1995).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. ICRW, supra note 10, art. IX(i).
131. Id. art. VI.
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V. THE UNITED STATES: DOMESTIC RESPONSES TO THE ANTI-
WHALING MOVEMENT
Although the United States was once considered a leading
whaling force, 132 it enthusiastically responded to the anti-
whaling movement and has finally emerged at the forefront of
the controversy as a supporter of IWC policy. National concern
for marine mammals induced the U.S. to enact laws designed
to protect these creatures and increase states' compliance with
IWC regulations. More specifically, the U.S. has unilaterally
enacted two pieces of legislation intended to augment the en-
forcement power of the IWC through import and fishing sanc-
tions against countries who violate the regulations set forth by
the Commission.
A. The Pelly Amendment (1971)
In 1971, Congress passed the Pelly Amendment 1 3 in support
of the ban by the International Commission for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries' on salmon fishing on the high seas.' The
scope of the amendment has since expanded to include all spe-
cies of fish along with endangered or threatened species such
as whales. 3 1 Pursuant to the Pelly Amendment, if the U.S.
Secretary of Commerce determines that nationals of a foreign
country are engaged in fishing operations or harvesting endan-
gered or threatened species in a manner that "diminishes the
effectiveness" of an international conservation program, he or
she "shall certify such fact to the President."'36 Upon receipt of
the certification, the President has the discretion to direct the
Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the importation of fish or
wildlife products from the offending country.137 The President
may choose to forgo the actual implementation of sanctions
132. See Berger-Eforo, supra note 6, at 451.
133. 22 U.S.C § 1978 (2000).
134. Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embar-
goes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save the Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477, 482 (1991).
135. Id. at 483.
136. 22 U.S.C. § 1978.
137. Id.
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against another country in the hope that the threat will be suf-
ficient to encourage compliance. Within sixty days of receiving
the certification, the President is required to report the action
taken or provide reasons for failure to take action.138 Any im-
port sanctions imposed under this amendment must be consis-
tent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT").19
In 1974, the first certification instituted under the Pelly
Amendment was directed at the whaling activities of Japan
and the Soviet Union.' Since the countries lodged timely ob-
jections to an IWC regulation decreasing the quota for minke
whales, their harvests in excess of the quota were not techni-
cally violations of the regulation. Outraged at the apparent
abuse, the U.S. certified both countries. Since both countries
had announced their intention to strengthen their conservation
efforts and abide by IWC quotas, President Ford declined to
take action and notified Congress that trade sanctions would
not be imposed."'
In 1978, the United States again certified Chile, Peru and
the Republic of Korea under the Pelly Amendment for their
whaling practices in violation of JWC quotas. Crucial to note
is that these countries were not members of the lWC at the
time of certification. Like Japan and the Soviet Union, they too
were not technically in violation of the ICRW. Again, the
President refused to impose sanctions on these countries.
Dissatisfied with the failure of the President to impose sanc-
tions in the situations mentioned above, Congress was forced to
reevaluate the effectiveness of the Pelly Amendment in regard
to international whaling operations. Legislators pointed to the
level of presidential discretion as the major deficiency of the
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. McDorman, supra note 134, at 484.
141. President's Message to Congress Reporting on International Whaling
Operations and Conservation Programs, PuB. PAPERS 47, 47-48 (Jan. 16,
1975).
142. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps to President Jimmy
Carter (Dec. 12, 1977) (on file with author).
143. President's Message to Congress Transmitting a Report, PuB. PAPERS
265, 265-266 (Feb. 13, 1979).
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Pelly Amendment and proposed to rectify this deficiency by
allowing some form of sanction upon certification.'
B. The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment (1979)
The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act of 1976' 45 was enacted to cor-
rect the deficiencies of the Pelly Amendment and impose auto-
matic economic sanctions against countries not abiding by IWC
regulations.146  Under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment,
the Secretary of Commerce is authorized to determine whether
nationals of a foreign country are engaged in operations that
diminish the effectiveness of the IWC by direct or indirect
means. 147  A positive finding by the Secretary of Commerce is
deemed a certification under the Pelly Amendment. However,
in addition to the President's receipt of notice of certification,
the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment directs the Secretary of
State to reduce by 50% the certified country's fishery allocation
in U.S. waters.'48
The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to in-
terpret the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment in Japan Whal-
ing Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society. 49 In a highly criticized
opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that the decision to im-
plement sanctions was voluntary and that the Secretary of
Commerce was not required to certify countries who captured
whales in excess of IWC quotas under the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment.' The decision afforded the U.S. time to negotiate
with Japan. In a series of secret negotiations, Japan agreed to
comply with the moratorium and avoid trade sanctions that
might have cost the country hundreds of millions of dollars in
damages.' Subsequently, the decision in Japan Whaling Ass'n
has been openly criticized by conservationists and legislators
144. See 125 Cong. Rec. H22, 083-84 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1979) (statements of
Reps. Murphy and Obestar).
145. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§
1801-1882 (2000) [hereinafter FCMA].
146. 16 U.S.C. § 1821.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
150. Id. at 222.
151. See Berger-Eforo, supra note 6, at 451.
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for contradicting legislative intent and undermining interna-
tional efforts to regulate whaling.
152
C. The Failure of Unilateral Action to Protect the Whales
Difficulty arises when an individual state attempts to enforce
an international regulatory regime through domestic measures.
In a few cases, threat of unilateral sanctions may result in a
token effort toward correcting the offense."5 3 Threatened na-
tions often respond with counter-threats that prevent countries
such as the U.S. from imposing sanctions, especially where the
trading relationship between the two nations is important for
both economies.
The executive branch has indicated a concern that an em-
.bargo on fish would inevitably result in a retaliatory embargo
on American fish exports.'5 Not surprisingly, Japan has
threatened to take such action as a leverage to forestall U.S.
sanctions.1 1 5 Japan maintains even more leverage due to in-
vestments in joint venture fishing operations with American
companies in the North Pacific. 56 This is extremely significant
since the U.S. alone has provided an enforcement mechanism
for the IWC. Pro-whaling nations are prone to base their deci-
sions on whether or not to observe IWC regulations on their
assessment of U.S. intentions.'57
More importantly, utilization of fishery import prohibitions
under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments raises
serious questions about the consistency of such action with
United States obligations under GATT.'58 The question of
whether the amendments will interfere with provisions of
GATT is not entirely clear. The vagueness of these provisions
and the lack of authoritative rulings make it nearly impossible
152. See McDorman, supra note 134, at 485.
153. Wilkinson, supra note 72, at 286.
154. Id. at 286.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
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to predict the outcome of future conflict.'5 9 Still, "a comprehen-
sive treaty such as GATT that lowers trade barriers signals a
move toward multilateralism that implies a disdain for unilat-
eral measures to further environmental goals."16 °
In response to Japan's decision to expand its whaling opera-
tions to include protected Bryde's and sperm whales, the U.S.
Secretary of Commerce, Norman Mineta, formally certified Ja-
pan pursuant to the Pelly Amendment on September 13,
2000.161 Secretary Mineta chided Japan for its activities and
noted that the U.S. government is "deeply concerned that the
real aim of this large hunt is to pave the way for an outright
resumption of commercial whaling."162 He added that "[b]y kill-
ing whales in defiance of the scientific advice of the [IWC] and
the clear expression of the majority of the [IWCI members, Ja-
pan is undermining the ability of the body to achieve its mis-
sion."63 After receiving notice of certification from Secretary
Mineta, President Clinton directed that Japan be denied access
to allotments for fishing in U.S. waters."M Since no foreign fish-
ing allotments currently exist in waters under U.S. jurisdic-
tion, whether certification and subsequent sanctions will affect
Japanese whaling is unclear.165
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Increased concern for the global environment creates the ne-
cessity for effective international agreements focused on the
preservation of common resources that transcend territorial
159. Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An
Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM.
U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 751, 775-90 (1994).
160. Schiffman, supra note 33, at 335-36.
161. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press
Briefing by Chief of Staff John Podesta, Secretary of Commerce Norman Y.
Mineta, NOAA Administrator D. James Baker, and NOAA Deputy Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs, Rolland Schmitten on U.S. Actions on
Japanese Whaling (Sept. 13, 2000), available at http://www.noaa.gov/whales
(last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Presi-
dent Clinton Directs U.S. Actions in Response to Japanese Whaling (Sept. 13,
2000), available at http://www.noaa.gov/whales (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
165. Id.
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boundaries. Accordingly, consenting nations have engaged in
multilateral treaties establishing cooperative legal obligations
to achieve an environmentally conscious result. Implicit in
these treaties is the notion of national sovereignty - a concept
that often leads directly to the ineffectiveness of the treaty.
While allowing states to bind themselves to international
agreements that preserve their national sovereignty tends to
increase the likelihood that a state will agree to the norm, it
will also increase the possibility of seriously undermining the
norm's enforcement.
National sovereignty is carefully guarded by individual
states and is rarely compromised. Historically, customary in-
ternational law stipulated that a sovereign state has jurisdic-
tion to prescribe and enforce laws only within its territorial
boundaries.166 Subsequently, this custom was incorporated into
international environmental treaties like the ICRW. 16 7 As dem-
onstrated, this compromise precipitated the failure of the IWC
to protect the great whales from continued exploitation.
Recent progress in the field of international environmental
law may shed some light on the current whaling controversy by
providing alternatives to strengthen conservation efforts. One
commentator has argued that nearly nine hundred multilateral
legal instruments addressing environmental concerns have
played an integral role in "setting the pace for cooperation in
the international community in the development of interna-
tional law." 68 First, it is crucial to highlight a significant
change in the focus of international agreements since the im-
plementation of the ICRW in 1946. Accordingly, early treaties
like the ICRW were almost entirely concerned with limiting the
excessive killing of animals in danger of becoming seriously
depleted through human exploitation.'69 Recently, the empha-
sis of international environmental treaties has shifted to ad-
dress concerns regarding the disruption of wildlife habitat and
also the preservation of delicate ecosystems.70 Instead of sim-
ply focusing on the management of a particular species, the
166. Ardia, supra note 19, at 497.
167. ICRW, supra note 10, pmbl.
168. Brown-Weiss, supra note 11, at 675.
169. LYSTER, supra note 25, at 299.
170. Id.
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IWC should be encouraged to incorporate this comprehensive
approach into its framework. Closely related to this issue is
the necessity for improved scientific research conducted by an
international body. Second, a system designed to increase
compliance among member nations at the international and
domestic level must be introduced. Third, improved monitoring
with the assistance of non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") is also required. Finally, an effective dispute resolu-
tion system should be implemented.
A. Improved Scientific Research With An Ecological Approach
The signatories of the ICRW entered into the treaty to en-
sure the sustainable development of whale species that would
provide for economically prosperous future harvests. As the
environmental climate of the world changed in the mid-1970's,
the IWC demonstrated a shift toward conservation of whales
that culminated in the establishment of an indefinite morato-
rium on commercial whaling. Japan, a country intent on ex-
ploiting the popularity of whale in the marketplace, has con-
tinued the practice of commercial whaling utilizing the scien-
tific research exception. 7' One of Japan's more notorious ar-
guments in support of its controversial whaling activity is that
the IWC has acted on irrational emotions and inaccurate scien-
tific data that seriously underestimates whale populations.'
Japan's argument fails to take into account the position of
whales in the ocean's food chain. Whales play a crucial part in
maintaining the equilibrium of the ecosystem. Thus, "the kill-
ing of one whale amounts to harvesting from three hundred to
five hundred square kilometers of ocean area."
73
Scientific uncertainty is deeply imbedded in international
environmental law.1'7 This is especially true in the instant
case, given the migration patterns of whales throughout the
world's oceans, low rates of reproduction, late onset of sexual
171. Berger-Eforo, supra note 6, at 450.
172. Id.
173. Dr. W. M. von Zharen, Ocean Ecosystem Stewardship, 23 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL. REV. 1, 20 (1998).
174. Brown Weiss, supra note 11, at 688.
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maturity and small populations. 75 Accordingly, current meth-
ods for ascertaining whale populations have proven danger-
ously inaccurate because the data is subject to individual bi-
ases and methodological flaws. 7' Relying solely on information
from member nations utilizing these potentially erroneous
methods, the 1WC has been unable to compile reliable records
of whale stocks and catch statistics. Whaling nations have of-
ten capitalized on this dependence by refusing to supply the
IWC with crucial data or by severely under-reporting catch sta-
tistics over the years.7 7
The need for an independent organization to supply the IWC
with accurate and current information is apparent. Proponents
of whale preservation tend to base their arguments on scien-
tific knowledge of whales indicating that the animals are intel-
ligent, sentient beings capable of communicationY.8 For exam-
ple, studies suggest that the large brain size of whales coupled
with systematic and cooperative hunting techniques exhibit the
superior mental abilities of marine mammals. 9 Further evi-
dence of whales' intelligence is found in their ability to commu-
nicate with one another.8 0 Much remains unknown about the
species. This deficiency in knowledge can be remedied through
use of non-lethal scientific research.
To serve both the consumer and conservation interests, the
proposed scientific organization must be deemed legitimate in
the eyes of pro-whaling and anti-whaling nations. To ensure
legitimacy, this supranational organization should be estab-
lished outside the framework of the IWC and should be em-
powered, by amendment, to issue binding decisions regarding
175. See Burns, supra note 23, at 64. The life cycle of the whale is extraor-
dinarily fragile. Usually only one calf is born at a time and the gestation
period may last upwards of one year depending on the species. Schiffman,
supra note 33, at 322. In the majority of large whale species, the females do
not become pregnant again until their young are weaned. Id. As a result,
whales rarely reproduce more than once every two years. Id.
176. For a detailed explanation of current whale counting methods, see
Burns, supra note 23, at 58. Present considerations regarding the viability of
whales also fail to take into account the potentially disastrous effect of ma-
rine pollution, depletion of the ozone layer and climate change. Id.
177. Caron, supra note 126, at 171.
178. Scbfiman, supra note 33, at 320.
179. Id. at 321.
180. Id.
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the efficacy of proposed scientific research catches by member
nations. The agency should be instructed to certify only non-
lethal research programs focused on the comprehensive study
of marine mammals and their ecosystem and food supply. The
organization should also encourage research aimed at uncover-
ing the relationship between whale populations and environ-
mental degradation such as marine pollution and depletion of
the ozone layer. Member countries would be required to make
defined contributions to the agency, which should be comprised
of scientists nominated by the nations subject to approval by
the Commission. Inevitably, recommendations by the agency
would rarely be the result of unanimity. Nevertheless, the
agency should be allowed to issue determinations based on a
majority vote.
B. Independent Monitoring as a Means to Strengthen Compli-
ance
The history of the IWC has been marked by a series of infrac-
tions committed by whaling nations in the interest of profit.""
These infractions, along with numerous other acts intended to
undermine the spirit of the Convention, are a direct result of
poor monitoring and ineffective enforcement mechanisms.
Given the large jurisdictional area under the IWC's control,
independent monitoring is critical to identify and prevent vio-
lations that no state can easily uncover. Abundance of these
violations also seems to indicate that states are cognizant of
the inability of the IWC to punish infractions.
Under the current scheme, whaling nations are required to
maintain at least two inspectors on each ship "for the purpose
of maintaining twenty-four hour inspection" and adequate in-
spection at each land station.' Not surprisingly, these na-
tional inspector schemes have proven ineffective since a strong
tendency exists for inspectors appointed and financed by their
own governments to overlook infractions.183 In place of the na-
tional observer scheme, the IWC should require member na-
tions to appoint individuals who would serve as inspectors on
factory ships and in land stations as determined by the Com-
181. See generally Berger-Eforo, supra note 6.
182. Schedule, supra note 125, art V.
183. Burns, supra note 23, at 75.
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mission. The Commission would then assign inspectors to
various locations on a six-month rotation. Inspectors would be
responsible to ensure the application of IWC mandates and to
report any abuses directly to the Commission. Nations deter-
mined to be in violation of IWC regulations would be required
to respond to the allegations in a hearing held by the Commis-
sion. The information would be disseminated among the mem-
ber states, and if egregious enough, to non-member states and
NGOs as well.
NGOs may also be effectively utilized in the monitoring
scheme. Unlike member states who may be concerned with
retaliation, NGOs are politically independent and, as a result,
more aggressive enforcers of international norms."M For exam-
ple, NGOs have the ability to put direct public pressure on a
state, organize a boycott or take direct action against violators
since they are not subject to political pressure from the non-
compliant state.1" This is significant given the fact that NGOs
are credited with initiating the first worldwide campaign to
stop the slaughter of whales. 86 Graphic videos and public news
stories brought the plight of whales to the attention of the in-
ternational community and played an important role in trans-
forming the composition of the IWC. 87 With this in mind, the
JWC should grant NGOs the ability to present evidence of in-
fractions to the Commission.
C. Effective Dispute Resolution
At present, the ICRW provides no mechanism by which
states may effectively resolve disputes regarding whaling ac-
tivities. The United States has attempted to respond to this
deficiency by enacting domestic legislation to impose trade
sanctions on nations who undermine IWC's authority.88 Uni-
lateral sanctions may be viewed as contrary to the spirit of
multilaterialism embodied in the GATT and may be deemed
illegal by a future GATT panel. 89 Thus, a possible remedy for
184. Ardia, supra note 19, at 560.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 22 U.S.C § 1978 (2000); 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (2000).
189. Schiffinan, supra note 33, at 339.
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violations of IWC regulations may be found in comprehensive
dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS. Where state parties
are unable to resolve a dispute "concerning the interpretation
or application of an international agreement related to the
purposes of [UNCLOS], "19 the Convention provides that a state
party may bring a claim against another state in any of the
following fora: (1) the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea in accordance with Annex VI; (2) the International
Court of Justice; (3) an arbitral tribunal in accordance with
Annex VII; or (4) a special arbitral tribunal in accordance with
Annex VIII. 1 It appears fairly reasonable to conclude that
state actions which diminish the effectiveness of an IWC regu-
lation will be subject to the UNCLOS dispute settlement proce-
dure, especially since Article 65 indicates that marine mam-
mals deserve special protection in the EEZ. Specifically, Arti-
cle 65 states:
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or
the competence of an international organization, as appropri-
ate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine
mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part. States
shall cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine
mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall in particular
work through the appropriate international organizations for
their conservation, management and study.1
92
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite historic overexploitation, whales are now afforded
protection from all but a few states. Activities of these states,
most notably Japan, have prevented the protection of whales
from achieving the status of customary law binding on all na-
tions. If pro-whaling states determine that continuous interna-
tional objection to their whaling activities outweighs the poten-
tial economic benefit of harvesting the animals, they may likely
abandon their current practices.
190. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 288(2).
191. Id. art. 287.
192. Id. art. 65.
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In the meantime, the IWC will have to reform its policies to
ensure greater monitoring and reliable scientific data while
maintaining its legitimacy in the eyes of pro-whaling and anti-
whaling nations alike. Individual states should be encouraged
to continue the protest against Japan's whaling activities with-
out incurring GATT-related liability. Further, the efforts of
non-governmental organizations to publicize Japanese whaling
hunts should be applauded. The pressure of public opinion
may eventually devastate the already controversial whaling
industry.
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